The essays that constitute The Federalist Papers were published in various New York newspapers between October 27, , and August 16, , and appeared in book form in March and May They remain important statements of U. The Federalist Papers originated in a contentious debate over ratification of the U. After its completion by the Constitutional Convention on September 17, , the Constitution required ratification by nine states before it could become effective. A group known as the Federalists favored passage of the Constitution, and the Anti-Federalists opposed it. To secure its ratification in New York State, Federalists Hamilton, Madison, and Jay published the Federalist essays under the pseudonym Publius, a name taken from Publius Valerius Poplicola, a leading politician of the ancient Roman republic.
Federalist No. 78
The Avalon Project : Federalist No 62
This is the first of five essays by Publius in this case, Hamilton on the judiciary. The heart of this essay covers the case for the duration of judges in office. This arrangement does not render the judiciary the supreme branch of government. Rather, it ensures that the Constitution remain the supreme law of the land. Publius contrasts this rule with that which applies in representative governments without a written constitution. In those systems, if a law is passed which contradicts an earlier law, judges are obliged to rule that the more recently passed law invalidates the first.
Federalist No. 69
Even those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.
In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.